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We publish a quarterly newsletter to update clients on legal and firm developments. The newsletter includes a Health Law Supplement, written by Bruce, devoted to topics in mental healthcare and health law. Back issues of the Supplement from the past three years are reprinted here, the most recent first. Information in the Supplements is not legal advice for any particular client or matter. Consult with an attorney individually for legal advice tailored to your legal needs and situation. All Health Law Supplements are copyrighted.
HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Summer 2010, #33 Kendra’s law to expire or be renewed. First passed in 1999 and renewed temporarily in 2005, the law expires this month. It was named after a woman who was pushed in front of a subway by a mentally ill man with a history of hospitalizations. It allows courts to order severely mentally ill patients to attend involuntary (assisted) outpatient treatment programs (AOT’s). A recent study found evidence that mentally ill persons under court order are less likely to be arrested or hospitalized, and also that 82% of AOT orders were for residents of Nassau, Suffolk and New York City. About 2/3 of those under court order are black or Hispanic. Organizations of family members of the mentally ill generally favor the law, while patient advocacy organizations generally do not, feeling that the law may be discriminatory and is based on a misunderstanding that the mentally ill are prone to violence. Forty-four states have similar laws. The New York State Psychiatric Association opposes renewal of the law. American Psychological Association changes its ethics rule (Standard 1.02) regarding conflicts between ethics and law. Previously, psychologists were required first to seek to resolve any conflict, but then were permitted to follow the law in the event that the conflict proved irreconcilable. This permission was often used by psychologists served with court orders to produce patient records over patient objections, especially in family matters, e.g., in a custody dispute, a therapist treating a wife might be ordered to produce treatment records without the wife’s authorization when a judge overrode privilege because he or she felt the records might assist in making a necessary decision about the best interests of the child. The APA believed, however, that this general deference of ethics to law, seemed to give license to psychologists to engage in torture or punishment that might be legally sanctioned but should nevertheless be deemed unethical. The new standard, effective this month, eliminates the language that gave explicit permission ultimately to follow all legal mandates, and substitutes a statement that psychologists may not "justify or defend violating human rights." This change settles the issue that psychologists may not engage in torture or inhumane punishment even if it’s legal, but seems to me to leave psychologists with less clarity as to how to handle more commonplace ethical-legal conflicts like the family law example above. Employees and contractors must be screened for Medicaid and Medicare ineligibility. With increasing coordination, whenever healthcare professionals are subject to serious criminal charges, or professional misconduct sanctions such as any type of suspension, they may also penalized by the NYS Office of the Medicaid Inspector General (OMIG) and the federal DHHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) by being placed on a list of providers ineligible to participate in Medicaid or Medicare. Submitting bills for the services of such excluded providers violates State and federal law. The OMIG and OIG have recently published their positions that all employers and contractors of healthcare professionals for whose services Medicaid or Medicare may be billed must perform a web search upon hire of each employee, and must re-screen all employees on a monthly basis. To facilitate the latter, they maintain a "short list" at their websites which lists changes over the past 30 days. OMIG is at www.omig.state.ny.us at "Resources" under "Disqualified Individuals." OIG is at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/exclusions.asp. Red Flag Rules compliance delayed again until December 31. The FTC has again delayed the enforcement deadline for its Red Flag Rules. The Rules require creditors, which according to the FTC include healthcare practitioners, to develop plans for identifying and preventing identity theft. In May, the AMA and other groups filed suit to prevent the FTC from applying the rules to physicians and other healthcare practitioners. The delay is intended to resolve the conflict about the types of businesses to which the law should apply. (The new edition of our HIPAA Manual, described below, contains Red Flag Rules compliance guidelines for small mental health practices; because the Rules are "scalable" and to some extent overlap with the HIPAA Rules, the guidelines are not, in my opinion, onerous.) A new edition of our HIPAA Manual is now available from our office. The older 2007 edition of the Manual is now outdated. Pursuant to the federal HITECH legislation of 2009, new HIPAA Rules take effect in 2010 that mandate changes in the Notice of Privacy Practices, Policies and Procedures Handbooks and Business Associate Agreements, and new breach notification procedures, among others. Relatedly, the FTC has a new "Red Flags Rule" to prevent identity theft, and New York State has changed its record access denial forms and now has its own breach notification law. Certain of the recommended means to comply with the HIPAA Rules have also changed.The "HIPAA Compliance Manual for Small Mental Health Practices in New York State, Third Edition 2010" has all of the instructions and forms needed for current compliance with the HIPAA Rules and related laws and is designed especially for small mental health practices, those of psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, mental health counselors, nurse practitioners-psychiatry, marriage and family therapists, creative arts therapists and psychoanalysts. The new edition of the Manual contains 14 new pages (a total of 102), 4 new forms (a total of 21), and numerous textual changes. As with prior editions, we have tried to make it the most accurate, simple, and cost-effective compliance program possible. The new Manual also contains as supplements basic record-keeping templates for psychotherapists and informed consent forms for individual, child, couple and family, and group therapy. Finally, a CD-ROM (Word file) containing the entire Manual is included. Even practitioners who are not HIPAA compliant will find much of the information and many of the forms useful; HIPAA has established new standards of care for the privacy and security of patient health information that are relevant for all practitioners.
HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Spring 2010, #32 Changes to NYS Managed Care Laws: Several changes, all favorable for practitioners, were recently enacted into law in New York State as part of a comprehensive bill (A. 8402). They became effective January 1, 2010. The most significant were: 1. The Prompt Pay Law was amended to reduce the amount of time that health plans have to pay claims submitted electronically. It was 45 days; now it’s 30. 2. Health plans may no longer require practitioners to submit claims within 60 or 90 days or else forfeit payment, a common practice now. The plans must allow 120 days, and if in filing after 120 days, the practitioner can demonstrate a prior pattern of timely compliance, the plan must still pay at least 75% of the claim. 3. Health plans must process credentialing applications of prospective panel members within 90 days. 4. Plans may no longer unilaterally change material provisions of their contracts, including reimbursement rates, with panel members, as they have done so frequently in the past. They must provide 90 days notice of any material change, and affected practitioners will have the right to terminate the contract on the effective date of the change. Federal Mental Health Parity Law takes effect: The federal Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act passed by Congress in 2008 took effect January 1, 2010. It applies to benefits offered by employers of more than 50 persons, including self-funded (ERISA) plans and plans subject to state laws. This federal law does not require that all health plans offer coverage for mental illness; however, if they do, then benefits must be on a parity with coverage for physical disorders, i.e., no differences in deductibles, co-payments, length of hospital stays, number of psychotherapy sessions, out-of-network coverage. It also allows plans to exclude coverage entirely for certain mental disorders. But it defers to state laws that may mandate broader benefits and coverage. For example, in New York State, under Timothy’s Law, all health plans must offer certain limited mental health benefits (20 outpatient visits and 30 days in hospital) and all plans offered to groups of 50 or more must offer parity coverage of "biologically based" adult mental illness and "severe emotional disturbances" of children. And Medicare follows suit: The above-mentioned Federal Mental Health Parity Law does not apply to general Medicare Part B. But another law, also passed in 2008, does. The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA) is a mental health parity law for all Medicare insureds that takes effect gradually, beginning January 1, 2010. Prior to passage of the law, Medicare insureds paid 50% of the cost of their Medicare-covered outpatient mental healthcare. During calendar years 2010 and 2011, that patient co-payment will be reduced to 45%. The co-payment will continue to be incrementally decreased until January 1, 2014, when Medicare patients will pay just 20% of covered charges, the same as they have always paid for their other Part B benefits. Note that diagnostic evaluations are covered at parity - 80% - immediately, as of this year, and will not be subject to the gradual phase-in. A consequence of parity: Some Medicare Advantage managed care plans already have full parity for mental health benefits. A recent study indicated that patients insured under these plans appear to have significantly higher rates of usage of their mental health benefits than patients with intermediate or no parity. (But also note prior studies that patients who make use of their mental health benefits are less likely to use more expensive physical healthcare benefits.) (over) Malpractice risks in psychiatry: A recent article complained of the lack of precise data but attempted to list in order the malpractice risks for psychiatrists: patient suicide; lack of emergency availability; failure to warn third parties of danger from patients; medication side-effects; boundary violations with patients; and internet therapy and prescribing. Patient suicide is not the most frequent cause of lawsuits but is considered the highest risk because of economic exposure; damages sought are the loss of lifetime earnings. Psychiatrists who solely prescribe and don’t provide psychotherapy have less risk of lawsuits. Psychiatrist-psychoanalysts have fewer claims against them than psychiatrists with other psychotherapeutic orientations, presumably because the intense relationship between analyst and analysand inoculates against legal action. Crackdown coming on employees mis-characterized as independent contractors: Healthcare practices that retain healthcare professionals and others as 1099 independent contractors are advised to have such relationships reviewed closely now by an attorney or accountant. Last month the IRS announced it would begin a new initiative to penalize any mis-classification of employees as contractors. New York State has recently begun a similar effort. Issues of mis-classification by our healthcare clients that have arisen upon audit have most often been due to: the use of full-time contractors or those without other engagements; required supervision of the ongoing work of contractors; control over work hours of contractors; restrictive covenants imposed on contractors; and payment arrangements for contractors that simulate hourly wages. Penalties for mis-classification can be severe and multiple. Penalties for HIPAA violations increase: Prior to the 2009 HITECH revision of HIPAA (see the Winter 2009 Newsletter at our website), the federal Department of Health and Human Services did not impose penalties if a covered entity established that it was reasonably diligent in its compliance efforts but still did not know that its conduct violated HIPAA standards. This "lack of knowledge" defense was abolished last month. Penalties will now be imposed on all violations, ranging from $100 for violations attributable to "lack of knowledge," to $50,000 for uncorrected willful neglect. Ignorance even if justified is no longer an excuse. The previous educational approach taken by HHS toward first-time non-willful offenders is no more. The military endorses online therapy: As of last year, on an experimental basis, TRICARE (formerly CHAMPUS to you old-timers; a single payer health insurance available to members of the US military, including the National Guard, and their families) has offered video-webcam online short-term mental health counseling to its insureds in the US. Skype is used to deliver the service. It’s free, available 24 hours a day, and is staffed by psychologists. It was theorized that this means of access might alleviate concerns about confidentiality and stigmatization that are believed to predominate among members of the military. It seems inevitable to me that this method of delivering mental health services to the public will eventually be reimbursable by most insurers.
HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Winter 2009, #31 Notice to patients of breaches of their health information now required under HIPAA. A new HIPAA regulation took effect September 23, 2009 under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH). It requires notice of breaches of security by practitioners to the affected patients, the HHS Secretary, and if more than 500 individuals are involved then also to the media. A breach is defined as unauthorized acquisition, access, use or disclosure of protected health information (PHI). There is a "harm threshold" provision that removes the requirement of notice if the breach does not pose a threat of harm. For example, a fax containing PHI sent to the wrong number but quickly returned or destroyed might not be expected to cause harm so would not be reportable. In my experience, for small practices, the most common reportable breach would be the loss or theft of records. New York State also has a breach notification law, GBL §899-aa that requires notification to customers of any breach of "private information," defined as social security, driver’s license or other identifying numbers, account or credit or debit card numbers, or security codes or passwords. The Red Flag Rule is further delayed. The "Red Flag Rule," a set of regulations issued by the Federal Trade Commission, was first scheduled to take effect August 1, 2009 and then November 1, 2009. Now the effective date has been pushed back to June 1, 2010. The purpose of the Rule is to reduce identity theft. The FTC has so far insisted that it will be applicable to health care practitioners because they are "creditors" who bill patients and insurers for services. The Rule would require practitioners to establish policies and procedures to identify and prevent identity theft. The FTC has issued a "Do it yourself" kit for small businesses to comply with the Rule, at www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/redflagsrule/RedFlags_forLowRiskBusinesses.pdf Among other health care associations, the AMA continues to lobby against the application of the Rule to health care providers, so there is still a chance that the Rule may not be applied to them in June. An unintended corporate practice problem. There has been an unintended consequence of the new laws enacted over the past few years, one of whose purposes was to limit the practice of psychotherapy exclusively to licensed professionals and State licensed entities. Prior to the passage of those laws requiring licensure, many educational corporations and not-for-profit corporations had provided non-medical mental health services to the public even though they were without an operating license from one of the State agencies that issues them, the DOH, OMH, OASAS or OMRDD. Now the ability of such organizations to legally provide such services is in question. Organizations such as these, for example, some "clinics" affiliated with social service organizations or psychotherapy training institutes, serve a large segment of the public. Also in question is whether social workers and mental health practitioners who work in such settings under supervision may use that supervised experience as qualifying experience for licensure or advanced credentialing. Regulators and lawmakers have devised a proposed solution, which is to institute a sort of quasi-licensing procedure by which the educational and not-for-profit organizations would register with and meet certain requirements of the State Education Department. The registration would apparently have retroactive effect to resolve the issue of licensure qualifying experience. The legislature has not yet acted on the bills, A 8897 and S 5921. Hiring a student extern. Some practitioners and practices hire student externs to assist in providing mental health services to patients. Professional regulations generally permit the practice if the student is in a licensure qualifying graduate program and the site has been approved by the program as providing an approved supervised practicum experience and such experience is required for completion of the program. Some clients engage in this practice to save money as well as to provide training. If there really is a financial benefit to the employer however, then the student should probably be paid as an employee. The NYS Department of Labor has guidelines that distinguish between externs (or "trainees" as the Department calls them) who need not be paid, and those who must be employees and as such be paid at least minimum wage. To qualify as a trainee who need not be paid, one must be provided training similar to that received in school, not displace a regular employee, be closely supervised, be the primary recipient of any benefit from his or her labor, and not provide any immediate advantage to the employer by his or her labor. The last two qualifications are the most significant in differentiating those externs who must be paid. If the practice bills for the labor of the extern, then the practice is the recipient of benefit and is deriving an advantage from the labor of the extern. Bottom line: if you bill clients or insurers for the services performed by an extern, then the extern should probably be a W-2 employee with all that this entails, i.e., withholding of federal, State and City income taxes, FICA and UEI, and provision of NYS DBL and worker’s comp insurance. N.B. Students may not be retained as independent contractors because of the requirement of close supervision imposed by their lack of licensure and academic programs. Sex with a patient you plan to marry is still not OK. Ethics codes for mental health practitioners are clear in prohibiting sex with patients and former patients, with the latter either forever or for a considerable period of time. It’s been unclear however whether there was some type of implicit exception, at least in terms of enforcement by a licensing board, if a practitioner began an intimate relationship with a patient or recent ex-patient that developed into a marital one. An appellate court in New York opined that there was no such exception. The physician had argued that his constitutionally guaranteed right to marry was implicated. The court disagreed and held that a physician can be disciplined for moral unfitness even if the patient with whom he engaged in a sexual relationship eventually becomes his fiancé. Angelo v State Board for Professional Medical Conduct, Appellate Division, Third Department, October 22, 2009, NYLJ No. 505410. For LMHC’s and LMFT’s, a change in status under the National Health Care Reform Bill. The House version of the health care reform bill (H.R. 3962) contains, among many other provisions, one that authorizes licensed mental health counselors and licensed marriage and family therapists to bill Medicare. We’ll see whether the change stays in any bill that may eventually be passed.
HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Fall 2009, #30 Debt collection by psychotherapists: In addition to the difficulties faced by all creditors, therapists trying to collect on overdue accounts must deal with the legal, professional and ethical obligation to continue to respect the confidentiality of former patients. Regardless of whether therapists decide to refer overdue accounts (1) to an attorney or (2) to a collection agency or (3) to handle the matter themselves in Small Claims Court, all of these actions involve the release of some confidential information about patients. From legal and ethical perspectives, however, as long as prior notice is given, the unauthorized release is justified. Therapists are entitled to be paid and to redress the wrong of patients breaching contracts (to pay for services) and being unjustly enriched (by receiving services without paying for them). After telephone calls have failed, the first written attempt to collect any overdue account of an ex-patient should be by brief correspondence, mild in tone, reminding the patient of the debt, and requesting either payment in full or the willingness to pay in installments within a brief period. The letter should be sent addressed to the patient or if the patient was a minor, to a parent, and marked, "Personal and Confidential." Most risk managers and malpractice carriers will recommend that therapists not sue patients for overdue accounts unless the amount is substantial enough to justify the risks. Risk arises for two reasons. The first is that suing provides motivation to countersue. If the patient is a person who usually pays bills, he or she probably did not pay because of some dissatisfaction with the treatment and has decided to express this dissatisfaction by withholding the therapist’s fee. If payment is compelled, the patient may express frustration in a more direct way by countersuing for malpractice. The second reason for risk is that by suing, the therapist provides the debtor-patient with a no-cost forum in which to counter-attack. It is common for the defending patient, often upon advice of legal counsel, to offer as a rationale, or "counterclaim," that he or she didn't and won't pay because the clinician was negligent in providing services, i.e., was guilty of malpractice. The clinician must now notify his or her malpractice insurer and defend the treatment against the counterclaim, as well as assert the debt in the main action. And the clinician must then report whenever asked, such as on applications for employment, for provider status on managed panels, and for malpractice insurance that he or she has been sued for malpractice, with the lengthy explanations and risks of possible exclusion or higher premiums. For these reasons, many therapists do not refer collection matters to attorneys or sue as a matter of course. Although attorneys' letters themselves may bring results, the action they threaten is a lawsuit. Not wanting to risk having to take the matter to court, many therapists instead use collection agencies that do not threaten or initiate lawsuits, at least not at first and not unless the therapist specifically requests it in a given case. Rather than threaten lawsuits, collection agencies may instead threaten to report unpaid debts to major credit reporting agencies. With the implications this has for credit ratings and future applications for credit cards, loans and mortgages, many debtors who are able to pay do so. Some therapists wish to sue debtor patients without legal assistance in Small Claims Court, where, in New York State, the limit is $5,000. This avoids paying fees to attorneys or collection agencies, which are often up to half of the amount collected. If this is your preferred course of action, then to prevent countersuits, consider waiting for three years after treatment ends before initiating the legal collection action. Once three years has passed, assuming the ex-patient is an adult, the statute of limitations in New York State for malpractice will have expired. But the debt will still be actionable because the statute of limitations for breach of contract (non-payment) is six years. Thus the ex-patient can no longer countersue you for malpractice. Therapists who wish to handle debt collection in Small Claims Court often also have written contracts with patients which state that unpaid debts will accrue interest at a set rate. Ideally, therapists should inform patients in writing at the outset of therapy about the collection procedures of the practice and the limited breach of confidentiality patients can expect in any future collection action, i.e, name, address and telephone number of patient, dates and types of service, and amount due. If this is not done at the start of treatment, then it must be done prior to any collection action. Even if patients are notified at the outset of therapy of the possibility of collection action and its concomitant release of otherwise confidential information, it is probably wise to do so again immediately prior to the collection action. A "final collection letter" should be used to notify patients of the imminent and specific collection action you are planning to take and of the breach of confidentiality that will occur if you do. Such a letter must also be sent marked "Personal and Confidential," give the patient the legally required opportunity to dispute the claim, state options for payment, and be sent by some form of receipted mail. State and federal debt collection laws establish guidelines for all creditors that are relevant to the contents of a collection letter. See New York State Debt Collection Procedures, NY General Business Law Article 29-H, and federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 15 USC §1692 et seq. These laws forbid creditors from: stating that they represent or possess authority from a governmental body, law enforcement agency, attorney or the judicial process if they don't; asserting a right to collect fees that are not actually due; threatening to disclose information about credit-worthiness of a debtor that they know to be false; communicating with the debtor's employer before they have a judgment against the debtor; threatening to disclose information concerning the debt if the debtor disputes the debt, without also disclosing the fact of the dispute; communicating with the debtor in an abusive or harassing manner; and threatening to take any action which they don't in fact take in the ordinary course of business. Of course, the best outcome is to avoid the necessity of any collection procedures at all. Regular billing, not letting balances accrue, and making non-payment a clinical issue (as it almost always is if fees are reasonable and affordable to patients) are all tried and true preventive practices. Also, therapists with large practices who accept credit card payments find that helps to reduce problems and is worth the cost. Inebriated patient driving; duty to protect third parties? A legally knowledgeable client asked if she had a duty to call the police as a drunken client left a session stating an intention to drive home despite the therapist’s attempts to persuade him otherwise. She believed she might be so required because she had read of a recent case in Massachusetts, Coombes v Florio, 450 Mass 182 (2007), where a physician was found liable for not taking action to prevent a patient, to whom he had just administered and prescribed medicines with CNS depressant effects, from driving while impaired. (The patient did drive, got into an accident, and hurt someone; the victim sued the physician.) New York has had no similar case precedent so there’s no definitive answer. Still, in NY, under current legal principles and in some circumstances it’s possible that a prescribing physician might be obligated to try to prevent harm in such situations, including perhaps by calling the police. See ALI, Restatement of Torts, §41 (2005). A healthcare practitioner who has not prescribed or administered, however, such as the psychotherapist who called me, has some duty, but perhaps an attenuated one and only to the patient and not to third parties, that might be fulfilled by strongly advising the patient not to drive and by offering to assist with alternatives such as calling a relative or a taxi. I could not advise the client to call the police given the uncertainty in the law and countermanding risk of a complaint of breach of confidentiality.
HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Summer 2009, #29 Financial and legal issues in telephone psychotherapy. Private insurers generally do not reimburse for telephone psychotherapy. No CPT code for psychotherapy can be used for telephone therapy because it’s not a face-to-face service. Because it can be considered misleading, patients treated telephonically should not be billed for "individual psychotherapy," nor should their services be coded as 90806 or any other CPT code. Rather, in billing use the description "telephone psychotherapy" without any accompanying CPT code. Some insurers will, however, allow use of such CPT coding for and reimbursement of episodic telephone sessions such as when an established patient is away on vacation or home ill. But as far as I know, none allow these for regularly planned or frequent telephone therapy. Exceptions may be granted; you, the patient, or both of you may make a case to insurers that one is warranted, but prior full disclosure to the insurers would be required. There are standard of care issues as well. Can you provide psychotherapeutic treatment that meets customary standards for safety and efficacy by means of planned regular use of the telephone as a primary means of communication? Presumably, you will be lacking information that you might otherwise glean from face-to-face encounters with patients. Resolution of these questions require recourse to professional research and ethical and community standards. You might address them additionally in an informed consent document, in which you label as experimental the telephonic aspect of treatment, and if possible, offer patients alternative non-telephonic referrals if and when exigent circumstances arise. Whether a healthcare practitioner is permitted to provide telephonic professional services to a client in a state where the practitioner is unlicensed is unresolved. Public policy of states and risk management policy of practitioners would seem to militate against it. States wish to have jurisdiction by means of licensure over healthcare practitioners who provide services to their residents. Although it has not occurred to my knowledge, there is the possibility that a practitioner might be accused of unlicensed practice by the state in which the client resides (and in which the practitioner is unlicensed); unlicensed practice is a crime. Additionally, there is the possibility that, should the practitioner be sued for malpractice, insurance coverage might be questioned by the practitioner’s malpractice carrier for services rendered out-of-state on the basis of the practitioner having engaged in unauthorized practice. Having an out-of-state patient sign an agreement that for all purposes the site of delivery of all services shall be considered New York State and subject exclusively to the laws of this State might provide a technical solution to these issues, but is as yet untested also. Having initial and then some ongoing regular contact in New York State, i.e., an in-person intake and occasional face to face sessions, would bolster a position that New York is properly considered the situs of the services. Out-of-state telephonic "coaching"presents significantly less exposure than telephone therapy because coaching usually does not require a license, is not necessarily a professional activity, and has standards of care that are looser and vaguer. A court affirms that treatment records belong to the clinician. With so much written lately about patients’ rights, HIPAA and the like, it’s easy enough to understand why some patients, and even some clinicians, might believe that treatment records belong to or can be controlled by patients. Some clients have called us in confusion after a patient has demanded that all of his or her treatment records be destroyed or has demanded possession of the original treatment records (and not a copy). Under HIPAA and New York State Public Health Law §§ 17 and 18, upon their written request, patients are indeed entitled to copies of their records in most cases (there are exceptions where denial of access may be appropriate, albeit with notice of a right to appeal). But the original records of treatment are the exclusive property of the practitioner. For many reasons, among them regulatory requirements (see Rules of the Board of Regents 29.2 (a)(3) mandating record maintenance and retention) and defense against all manner of allegations, clinicians ought not destroy, alter, or transfer possession of their original records. In Chervonskaya v Bentley, 867 NYS2d 107 (2 Dept. 2008), a patient who sued a physician and had mistakenly obtained original treatment records was compelled to return them to the physician because that is to whom they belonged.. Malpractice exculpatory agreements generally invalid in New York State. A client called recently and asked if she might require low fee or pro bono psychotherapy patients to sign an agreement not to sue her for malpractice. The "consideration" received by the patient in exchange for relinquishing this right, necessary for even the possibility of a valid contract to be considered, was the low or no fee. While the therapist’s proposal might seem reasonable and equitable from a certain perspective, if legally challenged it would likely be invalidated by a court as "void for public policy" reasons, that is, that public policy precludes its enforcement. That’s what happened to such an agreement promulgated by a low cost dental clinic in Ash v NYU University Dental Center 564 NYS2d 308 (1st Dept 1990). The two rationales for the court’s decision were that (1) allowing such agreements might foster a two-tier health care system where the less affluent got lesser care because their providers were less accountable; and (2) the agreement was based on abuse of a special relationship between healthcare practitioner and patient where the clinician had inherently more bargaining power, and where it was antithetical to the fiduciary nature of the relationship for the clinician to act in such a purely self-protective manner. A different but similarly intended approach might be to require all patients, not just those paying lower fees, to mediate or arbitrate disputes with a practitioner, rather than sue. There is considerable interest currently in such arrangements and the law is less clear about their enforcement. Medicaid reimbursement for clinical social worker services at FQHC’s. As of February 6, 2009, psychotherapy conducted by social workers at Federally Qualified Health Centers is billable to Medicaid. Prior to the change, neither "medical social services" nor psychotherapy were billable, although psychological evaluation was, see 10 NYCRR 86-4.9 (c). FQHC’s are non-profit medical clinics licensed by the State operating in under-served areas that accept Medicare and Medicaid (of approximately 1000 licensed facilities in the State, 58 are FQHC’s). The new regulation includes as social workers not only LCSW’s but also LMSW’s practicing under supervision. The State was compelled to make this change in order to conform to Federal law. The change is a victory for the poor more than for any profession, and it highlights that non-medical psychotherapy has become an integral part of general healthcare services.
HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Spring 2009, #28 The Social Work Board clarifies supervisory requirements for LMSW’s. In recent communications available at its website, the Social Work Board has stated its interpretation of the supervision necessary for LMSW’s to provide clinical services to the public and to obtain the experience needed for progression to the LCSW license. The communications are available at: www.op.nysed.gov/swprivatepractice.htm. Except as grandparented, LMSW’s may not practice privately on their own, but may provide clinical services under supervision at a licensed healthcare facility or at the private practices of the LCSW’s, psychologists or psychiatrists who supervise them. However, there is a grandparenting provision that acknowledges that the above interpretation was not generally understood previously: LMSW’s who established private practices prior to February 2009 and employed a private supervisor may continue to practice in that manner until 2015, and may use that private supervision to qualify for the LCSW. New York State has a new Power of Attorney Law. It’s at NY General Obligations Law Section 5-1501 et seq. Two facets of the new law are especially relevant. Those of you who have had the foresight to execute POA’s for yourselves so that a trusted family member or advisor can maintain your financial affairs if you’re unavailable or incapacitated should consider consulting with your attorneys about whether you should execute a new one. Old POA’s are still effective but the new ones have potentially broader scope. The second reason, more pertinent to professional practice, is that the new POA form now extends coverage to medical records. The appointed agent, if the principal elects, will have status under HIPAA to obtain medical records of the principal. Under the law, the rationale for the agent’s ability to obtain medical records is that he or she will be empowered under the POA to make healthcare payment decisions and presumably cannot determine the reasonableness of medical bills without access to the medical records that support them. The agent under the POA cannot, however, make health care treatment decisions; that requires a Health Care Proxy. For mental health practitioners, some limitations may be imposed on the access of agents so that they are given enough information to make payment decisions but not sensitive and private treatment information that is unrelated to financial decision-making. Potential liability for lost records. Clients ask what might happen to them if they lose treatment records of patients. For HIPAA compliant offices, any records maintained electronically must be backed up. But what about records maintained only on paper that are lost, stolen or destroyed by fire or water damage? And for small non-HIPAA compliant offices that maintain computer records, what about some kind of computer catastrophe? If the loss of records is due to negligence on the part of the practitioner (e.g., leaving them in an unlocked car), and the lack of them results in some type of harm to a patient, then malpractice liability is possible. But the confluence of those two factors is unusual. More usual is a lack of records when a practitioner is defending against allegations of malpractice or misconduct by a patient, or when records must be produced for a patient access request, subpoena or insurance audit. Because maintenance of records is legally mandatory, the lack of them can be used as evidence against healthcare practitioners in malpractice or misconduct proceedings under the "missing evidence rule" unless counter-evidence is produced that justifiably explains their absence. "Acts of God" such as floods or fires are such justification as is criminal victimization, but the practitioner would be expected to produce corroborative documentary evidence such as insurance claims for the water or fire damage, a police report for theft, or a repair bill for a computer that has crashed. Perhaps the most common cause of missing paper records that I hear, that they were lost in a move, usually requires an affidavit (sworn statement) of the practitioner as support to try to avoid negative consequences. In a reimbursement challenge by an insurance company, secondary evidence of services rendered such as appointment books and affidavits of patients may also be necessary. Blogger Insurance. Some innovative clients in recent years have asked about the legal risks of creating blogs as marketing vehicles for their practices. The risks of professional liability for such blogs perhaps can be adequately dealt with by education, disclaimers, and caution. But there are other risks less under the control of the practitioner including allegations of defamation, invasion of privacy and copyright infringement. For example, someone blogging on your sponsored site might defame or publish private information about someone else, and you might be sued. Or someone might publish copyrighted material. Those possibilities might even have discouraged some clients from creating blogs. Now, for the first time to my knowledge, there is "blogging insurance." It’s called Bloginsure, costs a few hundred dollars, and is offered by the Media Bloggers Association. They require that you take a risk management course first. I don’t recommend or endorse this insurance, but for bloggers and would-be bloggers it might be worth investigating. New York Court extends immunity of expert witnesses to their written reports. One physician commenting as an opposing expert witness in a written report on the care of another physician made the expected negative statements about the clinical judgement of the other physician, but then went beyond the customary and said that the other physician’s particular type of misjudgement indicated that he also suffered from "...a certain lack of morality." The criticized physician sued for defamation, alleging that the statement regarding his alleged immorality was unrelated to the medical issues in the legal proceeding and was made in a written report and not oral testimony, and therefore should not be protected by the immunity that ordinarily accompanies live expert testimony. The court affirmed the "absolute privilege" of expert witnesses; they simply cannot be sued for what they have either testified to or reported in writing. Kaisman v Carter, 831 NYS2d 348 (SCt, NY Cty, 2006). Relatedly, in New York State if an expert has been appointed by the court, as is typically the case with court appointed impartial evaluators in custody and other family cases, then he or she would be protected by judicial immunity as well as expert witness immunity. Deed v Condrell, 579 NYS2d 930 (4 Dept, 1991). The available forum for a review of the propriety of a testifying expert’s statements is an ethics committee of his or her profession, however limited its remedies.
HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Winter 2008, #27 A couple of changes in Medicare procedure. (1) This year, Medicare changed its policy to allow healthcare practitioners to charge patients for missed appointments. Previously this was not permitted. Such charges may not be billed to Medicare of course. But now they may be billed to Medicare patients and paid out-of-pocket by them. CMS came around to believing that charging for missed sessions is justifiable because they represent "missed business opportunities." There is a proviso to the change: Practitioners may not discriminate against Medicare recipients and must charge the same fee for missed sessions to all patients. See CMS Manual, Chapter 12, section 30.3.13. I would add as a caveat that billing statements for missed sessions given to any patients, Medicare or otherwise, should not refer, either by CPT code or name, to the service that would have been provided had the patient shown up, but rather should indicate that the charge is for "reserved time." We have seen instances where patients sent to their insurers claims for reimbursement with attached billing statements on which practitioners had indicated the service that was to have been provided but was missed, without it being clear that no service was actually rendered. The insurers consider this fraudulent and may consider the practitioner complicit. (2) CMS has issued a new ABN form. ABN is an acronym for "Advance Beneficiary Notice of Noncoverage" although it might more properly be called "advance beneficiary notice of possible noncoverage." It can be found online as form number CMS R-131, ABN-G. Beginning March 1, 2009 only the new form can be used. For those unfamiliar with the form, it is used when a practitioner believes that Medicare may deny reimbursement for a service due to a lack of medical necessity. Once patients sign the form acknowledging this possibility, they may be held personally liable for payment. Depending on the option chosen by the patient on the ABN, there may still be a right to appeal a denial by Medicare, but the patient, rather than the practitioner, assumes responsibility for any appeal. Note that the ABN must be signed by patients prior to the rendering of the questionable services. Practitioners may still seek reimbursement from Medicare for the questionable services if the practitioner believes the service is medically necessary. An example may help explain use of the ABN. Following a retroactive audit by Medicare of medical necessity, some client-psychotherapists have been compelled to return to Medicare funds paid to them for the second of twice-a-week therapy sessions because the auditors believed that only one weekly session was necessary. Sometimes the refund occurs after a lengthy appeal process by the practitioner. Because those therapists had not sought ABN’s from their patients prior to treatment, they could not bill patients for the fees refunded to Medicare and the therapists therefore lost any payment for the second weekly sessions, including co-payments which had to be refunded to the patients. Had the therapists asked their patients to sign ABN’s indicating that the second weekly session might not be reimbursable, then following any refund to Medicare upon a finding of lack of medical necessity, the therapists could have held their patients responsible both for making any appeal and for the payments refunded to Medicare. That new federal mental health parity law. The bill passed by the US Congress bailing out banks was for some reason accompanied by a mental health parity law that had been bandied about for over 10 years. New York State has recently passed a parity law ("Timothy’s Law, see Health Law Supplement #20), and the federal law does not preempt state laws. However, unlike state parity laws, the federal law will apply to self-funded group plans, a very significant portion of insurance plans. There are limits on the extent of the new law though. The law does not apply to employers with 50 or less employees. It does not apply to the individual health insurance market. Although initially planned to apply to all patients with a DSM diagnosis, the final version of the law dropped that requirement to allow insurance companies to choose which mental health conditions and treatments will be covered. The law applies only to plans that include coverage for mental health; insurance companies are still free to offer no coverage at all for mental health treatment. Finally, the law doesn’t take effect until January 1, 2010. We won’t know for a while how it will be implemented. I’m a licensed mental health professional, Do I need malpractice coverage for coaching? Coaching, as distinguished from therapy, is meant to enhance normal functioning and not to treat symptoms of illness. Personal, life and executive coaches should have malpractice, or errors and omissions, insurance. Even coaches who are not licensed healthcare professionals- no license is needed in New York State to be a coach - should have insurance to cover any potential liability for coaching. The underlying question, then, is whether the malpractice coverage already in place for licensed professionals covers their coaching activities. There is a related broader issue, that of whether coaching conducted by licensed mental health professionals is necessarily within the scope of their professional practices. There is no legal answer to that question, or, more precisely, to the extent it’s a legal question, the answer is unclear. One California court decided that a professional serving as a life coach was subject to laws that mandate confidentiality for substance and alcohol treatment. and by implication, was acting in a professional capacity, People v. Barrett, 109 Cal App 4, 437 (2003). But a federal court found that coaching, although offered by a counseling center, was not a "health care" or professional service, Wolf v. Fauquier County Board of Supervisors (2007, ED Va). Whether coverage is in place therefore depends on the contract the professional has with his or her insurer. Some malpractice carriers for mental health professionals include coverage for coaching and some don’t. If your carrier doesn’t then you’ll need an additional policy to cover your coaching activities. Some malpractice carriers for mental health professionals condition coverage for coaching on it being part of the professional practice of the insured; in such instances, advertising should describe coaching as a professional, albeit not therapeutic, service.
HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Fall 2008, #26 LMSW’s and private practice. When the new licensing law for social workers took effect in 2004, most of its interpreters believed that the entry-level license for "licensed master social worker (LMSW)" would allow those licensees to operate private practices as psychotherapists as long as the licensees were under the regular supervision of an advanced licensee, a "licensed clinical social worker (LCSW)," or by a psychologist or psychiatrist. The practice of psychotherapy was included in the scope of practice of LCSW’s but not LMSW’s, but it was thought that the provision of the law ((Education Law §7701) that allowed LMSW’s to practice as psychotherapists "in facility settings or other supervised settings" included allowance to practice as a psychotherapist in the LMSW’s own private practice as long as supervision was obtained. Following a period of 3 years of weekly supervision in his or her private practice, an LMSW might become licensed as an LCSW, or so it was thought. In April 2008, State regulators in the Office of the Professions apparently changed their interpretation of the law, such that they now assert that LMSW’s may not offer psychotherapy from their own private practices, even if under supervision, and that supervision they may have received in their private practices cannot be qualifying supervision for the purpose of fulfilling the 3-year supervised practice requirement for the LCSW. It’s unclear whether LMSW’s may still operate private practices and offer some type of "evaluation," "intervention" and "counseling," all of which appear to be within the scope of their licenses, even if not "diagnosis," "psychotherapy" or "treatment planning," which are restricted to LCSW’s (as well as the other licensed mental health professions.) The devil here is in the definitions of these terms. This apparent change has caused consternation among licensed master social workers and their professional associations and I understand that they are attempting to negotiate with regulators a retraction of the new interpretation, some relaxation of it, or at least some clarification. Jonathan’s law implemented. Another law was passed in May 2007 that is named after a victim, this time a non-verbal autistic boy who was abused while in a private residential school that was under the aegis of the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (OMRDD), and whose family was prevented from obtaining knowledge of the abuse. Regulations implementing the new law became effective June 2008; see OMRDD regulations Part 624 and Mental Hygiene Law §§33.23 and 33.25 respectively. The regulations require that whenever mistreatment occurs in a facility operated or licensed by the State, parents, guardians, a family member or an advocate be given telephone notification and access to records of the incident and offered meetings with facility directors. Facilities may be fined up to $15,000 for non-compliance. A new type of Medicare audit is coming. As of Summer 2008, the federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) are expanding a pilot program in New York State in which private "recovery audit contractors" (RAC’s) review claims to find overpayments. The RAC’s are called "bounty hunters" by some, because they are paid in part on how many overpayments they find. Hospitals are the primary targets but private clinicians may be audited as well. RAC’s may not look back more than 3 years for overpayments, and for now, no earlier than October 2007. The best defense against a charge of overpayment is an adequate treatment record. Call us for templates of a psychotherapy treatment record that we believe provide adequate documentation of evaluation and treatment. Parents right to choice of type of mental health treatment. Sombrotto v Christiana W, 852 NYS2d 57 (1st Dept, 2008) is an interesting case with ramifications not only in the area of parents rights, but also possibly regarding changing standards of care. Since the Osheroff v Chestnut Lodge case about 20 years ago, it has generally been considered a breach of the standard of care in mental health practice for a hospital to offer exclusively non-medical interventions when a patient suffers from a condition that is considered amenable to medical care, e.g.,anti-depressants for depression, mood stabilizers for mania. This principle has been enunciated as the psychiatric patient’s "right to effective treatment." Christiana, a 14 year old girl was admitted to a psychiatric hospital after an uncertain suicide attempt. She was depressed, had dropped out of school, had just had a fight with her mother, and said she wanted to hurt herself but not necessarily die. Physicians at the hospital recommended medication (risperidone, lithium, depakote), but her parents declined consent to the medicines, and she was converted from voluntary status to involuntary status because she was assessed to present a risk to herself. The hospital reported Christiana’s parents to the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) for their alleged neglect of her medical and psychiatric needs by their failure to consent to the recommended treatment with medication. ACS investigated but did not find that medical neglect had occurred. Presumably in an attempt to assert their patient’s "right to effective treatment," the hospital then petitioned a trial court for an order permitting them to involuntarily administer medication to Christiana. Her treating psychiatrist testified that she had improved significantly during her hospitalization and was not currently actively suicidal but still he recommended medication because a recurrence of her acute symptoms was more likely without it in his opinion. The trial court granted the petition on the basis that a parents’ rights to raise children as they think best is not absolute, and parents’ rights yield to the State’s rights in promoting children’s welfare when parents reject treatment that is in their child’s best interest. An appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that no evidence had been presented that Christiana was suffering from a life-threatening illness, that ACS had found no neglect and that the parents had indicated an intention to seek alternative non-medical treatment, i.e., not including medication. The appellate court was also impressed with the treating psychiatrist’s testimony regarding side effects of the prescribed medication and his lack of certainty regarding its long-term benefits. It’s questionable to generalize from the specific facts of a case like this, but it could be argued that if parents have a right to decline medical treatment for their mentally ill children who might benefit from it in favor of other treatment, then hospitals may, in some cases, offer alternative non-medical treatment, as long as the condition is not life-threatening and, of course, proper informed consent, including regarding all treatment options, is obtained.
HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Summer 2008, #25 A change in the law for reporting child abuse and neglect in New York State. A change in the law took effect late last year . Prior to the change, mandated reporters at schools, hospitals, mental health clinics, and other institutional settings were required to report suspected abuse or neglect to a person designated by the institution who then would make the mandated report to the State Central Registry (SCR) of Child Protective Services (CPS). Now, mandated reporters must themselves make the report to SCR. Institutions are prohibited from requiring prior notice of reports from employees, from imposing conditions on reports, and from retaliating for them. The change is not intended to require more than one report. The purposes are to enhance the timeliness of reports, and to improve their accuracy by ensuring that first-hand reports are made whenever possible. Employees must still notify designated staff when or after a report has been made, and designated staff are then responsible for consequent internal administration and liaison with CPS. New York Social Service Law §413, Chapter 193 of the Laws of 2007. Boundary crossings and violations: caution. An area of potential professional, ethical and legal risk for psychotherapists is non-sexual boundary violations. The "boundary" of psychotherapy is formed by the therapist’s implicit agreement to act (i) to benefit the patient (and no one else to the detriment of the patient) (ii) by providing the agreed upon professional service, and (iii) to be compensated through customary professional payment arrangements. Boundary violations may be singular, apparently innocuous and clinically justifiable (often called boundary "crossings") or frequent, plainly exploitative and likely to be harmful to patients. Boundary crossings and violations often involve some type of dual relationship with a patient. Some actions are always improper. Others may be justifiable if certain criteria are met, but regardless, may still carry certain professional risks for therapists. Practices that are always improper include: engaging in dual personal, social or business relationships with current patients or accepting as patients persons with whom the therapist currently has such relationships; collusion with insurance fraud even if by silence; and using information gained from patients for financial gain, for example, in the stock market. Practices that may be permissible, depending on individual circumstances, include: accepting as payment in barter the patient's services or something of indefinite value; touching patients other than handshakes; accepting or giving other than token gifts; accepting as new patients family members or close friends of current patients; accepting as patients persons with whom the therapist has had prior but since ended, personal, social or business relationships; seeing patients in both individual and couples or family therapy; serving as both evaluator of and therapist to a patient; self-disclosure to patients of the therapist's personal problems; special treatment such as seeing the patient out of the office, extending the length of sessions, or forgiving or delaying payment; and making referrals from which the therapist stands to gain without having disclosed this to patients and having offered them other options which they feel free to choose. Boundary violations involving dual relationships have the potential for harm to patients even though some may seem harmless or even helpful to patients at the time, e.g., helping patients financially. With any sort of dual relationship, even ones entered into with the best of intentions, patients can mistake the meaning of the therapist’s actions, with the result that they feel aggrieved when an attempt is made to re-establish customary boundaries for the therapeutic relationship. Practically, dual relationships give rise to lawsuits because attorneys for potential plaintiffs can easily obtain opinions from experts that the ethics of such actions are questionable, as indeed they are, and because they are tainted by the sensationalism that surrounds sexual boundary violations and the "slippery slope" that supposedly precedes them. Questions to ask before permitting boundary crossings, or criteria for when boundary crossings might be allowable, are the following: Might this action impair the therapist’s professional objectivity? Might it interfere with or distort the therapy? Might confidentiality be threatened? Might it harm the patient? Is it in any way exploitative of the patient? Is it clinically contraindicated? Is there some way to achieve the end desired without taking this action? Only if all of these questions are answered negatively should a boundary crossing be considered. The standard to use is whether any negative outcomes are reasonably foreseeable as a possible consequence of the crossing. Most of the time, it’s best to discuss the issues first with a consultant, and if the result of the consultation is that the crossing may be justifiable, then discuss the issues with the patient as concretely as possible. If the patient objects or equivocates, then the action should not be taken. If the patient agrees, then you still must interpose your judgment. Note in the patient's clinical record that the issues have been discussed with the consultant and patient, their reactions, and all of the considerations, using the above criteria, for the decision. Sometimes, a consultation is not just recommended but critical: if a boundary crossing inures to the financial benefit of the therapist, this may be seen as tainting the therapist’s judgment in assessing it. While the standard enunciated by ethics codes and licensing boards is reasonable foreseeability of adverse consequences, in my experience, the actual standard they impose is often one of strict liability where dual relationships are concerned. That is, if the patient is harmed or claims to have been harmed by a dual relationship, then regardless of the care taken by the therapist in deciding whether to proceed with the dual relationship, he or she will be found liable or negligent. This is the reason that dual relationships almost always carry some measure of professional risk for psychotherapists. Suppose a former student requests therapy. The therapist first consults with the ethics committee of a local professional association and is told that the therapy may be conducted if no harm can be foreseen to the patient or to the therapeutic relationship. It would then be incumbent on the therapist to discuss with the patient all possible ramifications for the therapy of the prior teacher-student relationship. Would the former role of student prevent or hinder the development of a productive therapeutic alliance? Are the student’s expectations unrealistic because they’re based on the idealization of an admired teacher? Relatedly, is the student prone to splitting, suggestive of borderline qualities that might clinically contraindicate any boundary crossing? Does the prospective patient expect special treatment based on the prior relationship? Might the patient want to take another of the therapist's courses in the future and be prevented from doing so? Will the therapist, as a former teacher, be making any future academic evaluations of the prospective patient? Might the patient wish at some point to have a letter of recommendation from the therapist as a former teacher?
HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Spring 2008, #24 Use of employer’s email may abrogate privilege. This was the holding of a case before a New York State Supreme Court, Scott v Beth Israel Medical Center WL 3053351 (10/17/2007). It’s an established principle that legal privilege, such as that between attorney and client or between doctor or psychotherapist and patient, is maintained only as long as the holder of the privilege (the client or patient) evinces the intent to maintain the confidentiality of communication. It’s for that reason that we discourage clients from bringing friends to a legal consultation; in doing so, they may lose their privilege. In the case at bar, an employee-physician sent emails from his email address at his worksite to his personal attorney. He subsequently sued his employer, and, of course, did not wish his employer to view his emails to his personal attorney concerning the lawsuit. His employer had a policy prohibiting personal use of email at the worksite, which the physician clearly violated. Because of that policy and its violation, the Court ruled that the physician should have had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality and therefore his communications to his attorney were not privileged and were discoverable by his employer. Essential to the Court’s ruling were findings that the employer publicized its prohibition of personal emails, occasionally monitored employee emails, and notified employees of the ban and monitoring. This case has ramifications both personal and professional for health care practitioners concerning the confidentiality of their communications. First, if your employer prohibits personal email, don’t send any from the employer’s email address to your lawyers or doctors; they won’t be privileged. Second, be wary of sending emails to patients at any address that has not been confirmed as one that allows personal private communications. (NB There may be other reasons not to send emails to patients or respond to theirs.) NYS Attorney General investigating reimbursement rates of insurers. Last month, Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announced that his office is investigating UnitedHealth, Aetna, Cigna, Empire BC/BS and other insurers. The cause of the investigation is a belief by the Attorney General that the insurers have been using a manipulated database to calculate the "reasonable and customary" rate at which they reimburse their insureds for fees paid to out-of-network providers. The investigation has so far shown that Ingenix, the company that maintains the database for insurers, somehow calculated "reasonable and customary" rates that were signficantly lower than the actual cost of typical medical expenses. As an example, the AG’s office cited UnitedHealth’s assertion that a typical doctor’s office visit cost $77 and their reimbursing 80% of that amount, or $62, to patients, when, in fact, United knew that most doctor’s office visits cost $200 and they therefore should have been reimbursing $160. This investigation might benefit in-network providers as well. If the rate paid for treatment by out-of-network providers increases, then the rate paid to network providers may increase commensurately, either voluntarily by insurers, or by demand of in-network providers whose financial incentive to stay in the network will otherwise be lost. New York’s highest court decides to allow interviews of treating doctors. When a litigant has placed his mental state at issue in a legal action (such as in custody disputes, in mitigation of criminal charges, or in a malpractice, personal injury or discrimination suit), courts in some states have required that the litigant allow the defendant’s attorney not only to obtain treatment records from, but also to informally interview the litigant’s treating mental health care professionals. These interviews, called "ex-parte interviews" are used as a discovery device, sometimes preliminary to, but often instead of, more formal depositions. Heretofore, New York courts did not permit "ex-parte" interviews; now they will (Arons v Jutkowski, 2007 NY Slip Op 09309). In practical terms, that will mean that when you have a patient who’s suing someone, say a former employer for discrimination, and has placed her mental state at issue, say by claiming that the discrimination caused emotional trauma, then she may be compelled to sign an authorization permitting the employer’s lawyers to speak informally to you, her treating mental health professional. Previously, the patient could have (1) been ordered to provide the employer’s lawyers with an authorization by which you would have had to provide treatment records only; and (2) been compelled to allow you to answer certain questions at a deposition, also called an EBT or "examination before trial," conducted with both parties’s attorneys, perhaps your attorney, and a court reporter present. Ex-parte interviews and the authorizations allowing them, may, however, place psychotherapists in a problematic position, that of appearing to voluntarily harm a patient’s interests; avoiding harm to patients is a primary ethical mandate. For instance, continuing the above example, let’s say that you have not diagnosed the patient as suffering from trauma and have rather diagnosed her as having paranoid personality traits and a history of anti-social conduct. Any discussion of these qualities by you with the lawyer for her former employer will likely damage her claims for psychic injury in the discrimination lawsuit. New York’s highest court, in permitting litigants to compel authorizations for ex-parte interviews from other litigants did not then take the next step of ordering or compelling the health professionals to actually be interviewed. Even with an authorization by a patient to do so, a healthcare practitioner may decline to be interviewed. Of course, doing so may then lead to a more formal and time-consuming deposition of the practitioner, but that may be the ethically advisable course for the practitioner. Any practitioner receiving an authorization for an ex-parte interview is advised to seek legal counsel before responding. Information on Timothy’s law. The New York State Insurance Department has established a website with information about this new mental health parity law about which there appears to be some confusion, www.ins.state.ny.us/timothy.htm. HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Winter 2007, #23 Differing state standards for involuntary commitment. A new movie, Michael Clayton, (which I liked) raised the issue of the differences among states in standards for involuntary psychiatric commitment. These standards are important for private practitioners to know because commitment is an option that they must consider when patients present a risk of harm to self or others and won’t voluntarily seek an adequate level of care. In the movie, a New York lawyer, Arthur, stops taking his medication for bipolar disorder and decompensates, stripping naked in a deposition in Wisconsin, saying crazy things, abandoning his responsibilities at work, and assisting the opposition to prove wrongdoing (very real wrongdoing) against a big client of his. Another lawyer in his firm, Michael Clayton, threatens to have Arthur involuntarily committed. Arthur, who has returned to New York from Wisconsin, tells Michael that he missed the chance to commit him. Arthur, manic but still legally astute, knows that the threshold for commitment in New York is much higher than it is in Wisconsin. In New York the standard for involuntary commitment to an institution is that a person has a mental illness "...which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others." NY Mental Hygiene Law §9.55. New York courts interpret this standard to mean that the mentally ill person will present an imminent danger of physical harm to self or others if not hospitalized. Arthur probably could not have been committed using this standard. Wisconsin’s standard is quite different and more lenient in permitting involuntary treatment. It allows a mentally ill person who is deemed incapable of making informed medical decisions to be involuntarily treated if the treatment has a reasonable prospect of success. Wisconsin Statutes §51.20(1)(a)2.e. The constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute was challenged because it can result in a deprivation of liberty without a showing of dangerousness, but the law was upheld as the State acting within its legitimate parens patriae (parental) role, State v Dennis H, 647 NW2d 851 (Wis Sup Ct, 2002). Arthur very likely could have been committed under the Wisconsin statute because he was clearly ill, seemed to be acting against his own interests at least financially and professionally, and was refusing to continue previously effective treatment for no good stated reason. New York does have a commitment statute with less stringent criteria, but for involuntary outpatient treatment, the so-called "Kendra’s Law." New York Mental Hygiene Law §9.60. Under that law, an AOT (or "assisted outpatient treatment") Order may be obtained from a judge by a family member, treating doctor or hospital, or social service office when a mentally ill person refuses compliance with treatment. A showing of prior psychiatric hospitalizations or prior dangerousness is required however. An AOT Order against Arthur would have proved difficult for Michael Clayton to obtain because of a lack of standing and because Arthur had been stable for the past few years and had no history of dangerousness (as defined by New York law). Mentally ill persons often prefer laws like New York’s, where it’s harder for them to be deprived of their liberty and forced into treatment. Family members of the mentally ill may prefer a model like Wisconsin’s because it’s easier there to use the legal system as a coercive partner to persuade or force a mentally ill family member to accept treatment. Maltreatment by a sibling is not reportable abuse unless there’s parental neglect. This isn’t new information, but it’s well illustrated by a recent case. The facts were these. A mother suspected that her 9 year old daughter was being touched inappropriately by the child’s 14 year old half-brother. The mother tried to make a report to the Child Protective Services hotline but a caseworker declined to accept it. As a minor, the half-brother could not be the "subject" of a report; subjects must be parents, guardians or "legally responsible persons," the latter category being limited to those over the age of 18. The mother then advised her pediatrician of her suspicions and asked her pediatrician to make a report to CPS. (The mother believed, mistakenly, that a report by the pediatrician would have a better chance of being accepted for investigation.) The pediatrician declined to make a report based on the alleged molestation, and instead told the mother that her daughter should not be left alone with her step-son Six months later, the pediatrician was asked by the police to examine the girl after more serious allegations of sexual abuse were made against her half-brother. The pediatrician validated the abuse, and then reported the mother for neglect for failing to adequately supervise the children. The mother then sued the pediatrician alleging that the doctor should have reported the molestation when she was first told of it by the mother, and that had the doctor done that, the more serious subsequent abuse would not have occurred. The court ruled that the mother had no case and that the pediatrician’s actions were lawful. New York limits its definition of reportable child maltreatment to abuse or neglect by parents, or by "legally responsible persons," that is, who are 18 or older and are delegated responsibility by parents, e.g., a nanny. At the time of the mother’s first contact with the pediatrician, no reportable child maltreatment, as legally defined, had occurred. New York has a policy of non-intervention by the State when a minor is abusing a sibling because, said the Court, such situations "are within the capacity and authority of a fit parent." Defined maltreatment happens in such situations only when a parent knows or should know of the abuse and does not take appropriate action to prevent it. Page v Monroe and Adirondack Pediatrics, 2007 WL 1458201(NDNY, 2007). Breaches of confidentiality may result in punitive damages. A New York appeals court recently ruled that punitive damages might be imposed for unintentional but negligent breaches of confidentiality by healthcare practitioners where the breach has the potential for significant harm. Punitive damages are usually reserved for cases of intentional misconduct. They have deterrence as their purpose, that is, to deter the wrongdoer and others from such misconduct in the future. But this court stated that the right of patients to privacy of their healthcare records is so important a public policy that even an inadvertent breach might in some cases warrant punitive damages. The defendant, a clinic that performed abortions, reported to a family member of a patient the results of a blood test the patient had had at the clinic. The family member surmised that the patient had had an abortion at the clinic, and the patient’s relationship with her family suffered as a result. Randi AJ v Long Island Surgi-Center, 2007 NY Sl Op 06953 (Ap Div, 2D, 9/25/2007). Punitive damages are especially worrisome for healthcare practitioners because they may not be covered by malpractice insurance. (They may be covered if the liability is vicarious, that is, if the misconduct is by an employee.) This case also may have particular ramifications for mental health practitioners, because of the possible stigmatization associated with mental health treatment, similar in some respects to disclosure of an abortion.
HEALTH LAW SUPPLEMENT Fall 2007, #22 Is there a "Tarasoff" duty to protect in New York State? This is perhaps the most discussed issue at risk-management seminars I give. The short answer is a qualified "probably." The long answer follows. The legal principle of the well-known Tarasoff case is simply stated. When a therapist knows that a patient is likely to harm a specific third party, the therapist has a duty to protect and warn the intended victim of the danger. The Tarasoff court, a California court whose ruling applies only in California, held that the duty to protect can include notifying the police and taking whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances, Tarasoff v Regents of Univ of Calif, 551 P2d 334 (1976). Many states' highest courts and legislatures reacted to the Tarasoff ruling with holdings or laws that adopt, sometimes with limitations, sometimes with expansions, its basic principle. In the 20 years since its appearance, the principle had been flatly rejected in only one state, Florida, Boynton v Burglass, 590 So2d 446 (1991). No New York court has yet found a therapist liable for failure to protect or warn a third party. However, one New York court found that a breach of confidentiality by a therapist was justified when a therapist's patient threatened a third-party. A psychologist working at a State facility told the police that his patient had threatened the life of the psychologist's son's schoolmate during a therapy session. The psychologist also called the schoolmate's family and warned them about his patient's dangerous intent. The patient sued for breach of confidentiality, but the court held that the psychologist was justified in breaching a confidence, Oringer v Rotkin, 556 NYS2d 67 (1st Dept 1990). In another case, a New York court stated without holding (and thus with little value as precedent or as guidance) that "where a patient may be a danger to himself or others, a physician is required to disclose to the extent necessary to protect a threatened interest," MacDonald v Klinger, 446 NYS2d 801 (4th Dept 1982). One New York statute does permit breaches of confidentiality to protect third parties. New York Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13(c)(6) permits releases of information without a patient's consent by psychiatrists and psychologists working in State licensed facilities "to an endangered individual and a law enforcement agency when a treating psychiatrist or psychologist has determined that a patient or client represents a serious and imminent danger to that individual. The reasons for any such disclosure shall be fully documented in the clinical record. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to impose an obligation upon a treating psychiatrist or psychologist to release information pursuant to this paragraph." This law is significant for several reasons. First, it defines what type of danger must be presented before a breach of confidentiality can be justified, i.e., "a serious and imminent danger to an individual." Second, it specifically does not impose an obligation to protect third parties, only permission to do so. Finally, it applies only to doctors working in State licensed facilities, and not to private practitioners. Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that this statute indicates that New York has rejected any Tarasoff duty because an option is not a mandate. An issue that’s legally related to whether psychotherapists have a duty to intended victims of violent patients is whether outpatient therapists have sufficient control over patients so that therapists’ actions, or lack thereof, might be legally viewed as a possible cause of harm to endangered third parties. In one New York case, an appellate court ruled that an outpatient counselor had no duty to warn a husband of his wife's threat to him, Wagshall v Wagshall, 538 NYS2d 597 (2nd Dept 1989). The wife had shot her husband while they were in marriage counseling. The court seemed to base its decision on two findings; one, that the husband already knew of the wife's threat to him (she had assaulted him before) and; two, that the wife was not under the control of the therapist, and therefor the therapist's failure to warn the husband could not be legally viewed as a proximate cause of his injuries. This case can be seen as a rejection by one court of a Tarasoff duty, but it may also be limited by its peculiar facts. So what is the answer to the question in the title of this article? I think it’s this: New York courts and our State legislature have not clearly decided whether a Tarasoff duty exists in New York, but there are enough suggestions in our cases and our law so that it’s probably safer for a therapist to act as if there is such a duty. (Supporting this position is a finding by New York's highest court that, under some circumstances, a doctor can be liable to third parties for potential harm caused by the doctor's care of a patient, similar to but not exactly the same as the underlying principle of the Tarasoff case, Tenuto v. Lederle Laboratories, 605 NYS2d 17 (1997). A physician was found negligent for failing to warn an immune-compromised father of risks to him of administration of oral polio vaccine to his daughter.) Although New York courts and the legislature have not imposed a duty to protect and warn as yet, they have, in certain cases, removed the rationale formerly used for not acting when a third party was threatened, i.e., that it would be an unjustified breach of confidentiality. So the legal risk of protecting third parties, a suit for breach of confidentiality, is significantly lessened, while the legal risk of not protecting and warning third parties is potentially great. i.e., a suit for wrongful death. So if you’re to assume that you have a duty to endangered third parties, when does it arise and how should it be carried out? The Mental Hygiene Law can be used to determine when an obligation may arise: when you know of a serious and imminent threat of danger to a specific person. It may also arise if you know of such a risk to a class of identifiable victims, e.g., see Fraser v US, 236 Conn 625 (1996). For instance, a patient may threaten to burn down his place of employment. In the latter type, you may not know names of intended victims, but they can nevertheless be identified. It also may be helpful to illustrate when the duty may not arise: - If you are treating a child molester who molests without planning, i.e., neither you nor he knows who his victims will be in advance, you may not have a legal duty to his victims. They are not identifiable. - If a patient tells you he intends to kill his ex-wife on their 10th wedding anniversary, which is 2 years hence, you may not have a legal duty to her until the date approaches. The risk will not be imminent until then. - If a now happily re-married female patient tells you that she killed her abusive ex-husband five years ago, made it look like a suicide and was neither a suspect nor charged with a crime, there may be no duty. This is a past crime that you have no duty to report, and given the circumstances of the past crime, it does not suggest a serious risk to anyone in the present. - Suppose a male patient tells you that he intends to kill his wife, you believe that he might, and so you warn her and the police. Suppose then that his wife attempts to obtain an Order of Protection from Family Court and, in doing so, asks you to testify on her behalf about the threat that you believe is presented by her husband. Any possible duty to protect her might not extend to a duty to testify on her behalf, and doing so might even lead to viable actions against you by your patient for unjustified breach of confidentiality. Understand that I’m not suggesting that you do nothing in cases like those described above. Your professional conscience and clinical judgement may dictate that you take some action. (And if you do take action, please do so in consultation with an attorney to avoid or reduce potential adverse legal consequences.) The point is that a third party might not have standing to sue you based on your failure to act.
Falsification of treatment records; the professional price. A New York appellate court recently found "proportionate" the severe penalty imposed by a hearing panel of the medical licensing board on a physician who was found to have falsified a treatment record. Evidence had established that the physician had written a note in a patient’s chart that a complete exam had taken place when in fact the exam given had been partial. The penalty was a one-year suspension and three years of probation and supervision. Sookhu v. Commissioner of Health of the State of NY, 820 NYS2d 146 (3rd Dept 2006). Sometimes clients whom we’re defending in professional disciplinary proceedings ask what might happen to them if they get caught "fixing" a record. This hearing panel gave one answer to that question. Usually, I think, clients are asking what happens if they get caught adding to a patient record at a later date a notation of treatment or an evaluation that was actually conducted, and then presenting the record (falsely) as a contemporaneous one. That’s a bit different from the conduct of the physician in the case, but a licensing board might look at it just as harshly if it’s discovered; it’s falsification in both instances. (We always advise against altering records.) In virtually all disciplinary cases in which I’ve been involved in which a practitioner has been found to have falsified a record, the penalty imposed has been harsher than it would have been, in my estimation, if the client had not tried to cover-up the error or omission. And in case another reason is needed not to change records, it’s a crime as well in New York State, NY Penal Law Article 175, albeit rarely prosecuted. (See also Penal Law §215.40 prohibiting spoilation of evidence.) Alleged defamation by an expert-witness is immune from civil prosecution. One doctor (K) sued another doctor (C) for defamatory statements allegedly made by C about K. C made the statements in an independent medical examination report about K’s treatment of a patient. The IME report was prepared for a personal injury lawsuit. A New York trial court ruled that statements made by expert witnesses in legal proceedings, whether made in court or out-of-court (e.g., depositions, written reports) enjoy "absolute immunity" as long as they are material. If that protection were not provided, the court opined, expert witnesses would be averse to getting involved and courts need them to. Kaisman v. Carter, NY Cty Supreme Ct, #115999, NYLJ 09/29/2006. The ruling is consistent with others that have been made in New York. It’s also consistent with another trend of doctors using legal or quasi-legal actions and forums to try to hold other doctors who serve as expert witnesses accountable to some standard of care. Some see such attempts as a means to scare off doctors who might be inclined to testify against their incompetent peers. Complaints about expert witnesses have been successful in some instances when the doctor who believes him or herself to have been defamed has complained about the allegedly defamatory witness to a professional association of which both are members. And in fact, one prominent federal judge opined that ethics committees of professional associations (and not courts) are exactly the right forum in which these disputes should be resolved. Austin v AANS, 253 F3rd 967 (7th Cir 2001). Some confusion about reporting of elder abuse. Clients sometimes ask about their "duty" to report elder abuse to authorities, often believing that such reporting is mandatory as it is for child maltreatment. Reporting elder abuse is fully mandatory in some states, on a par with child maltreatment, i.e., practitioners must report suspected abuse to authorities and any duty to maintain confidentiality is overridden. In New York State, however, reporting of elder (or adult) abuse is mandatory only when it occurs in certain settings. Professionals working in residential health care facilities (e.g. nursing homes) must report any suspected abuse or neglect of patients in such facilities. New York Public Health Law §2803-d. The only other mandatory reporting of maltreatment of an adult in New York State occurs due to the extension in our child maltreatment reporting law of "childhood" to 21 years of age if the "child" is in "residential care." New York Social Services Law, Title 6. New York law establishes an agency, "Adult Protective Services," to investigate allegations of adult maltreatment and provide services and placement if necessary. New York Social Services Law, Article 9-B. But unlike with child maltreatment, private practitioners are not mandated to report to this agency maltreatment of adults seen in their private outpatient offices. In other words, unless they wish to risk complaints of breach of confidentiality, private and outpatient practitioners may not make such reports without the authorization of their maltreated (or suspected to be maltreated) adult patients. Emailing to and from patients; security issues. In increasing numbers, clients are asking about whether and how they may send email to and receive email from patients. With this new means of communication, concerns arise regarding HIPAA compliance, confidentiality and security. If a practitioner is HIPAA compliant, then under the Security Rule, encryption of email containing patient health information is an "addressable" requirement, i.e., a good reason is needed not to implement the security measure. Both HIPAA compliant and non-HIPAA compliant practices should advise patients of the inherent lack of security of email transmissions, encrypted or not. Generally recommended are disclaimers that: (1) your email communications are (or are not) encrypted; (2) you cannot guarantee the security of email transmissions; (3) patients may wish to provide sensitive or private information by alternative and more secure means; (4) no evaluation or treatment is offered by internet communication (this disclaimer has more to do with standards of care and boundaries -and lack of third party payment - than security); (5) you do not respond to email communications except with general information or regarding administrative matters; and (6) there may be a delay in your reading email communications, so they should not be used for any urgent matters. Our new revised HIPAA Manual is now available. Our new "HIPAA Compliance Manual for Small Mental Health Practices in New York State, Second Edition - 2007" authored by Bruce has all the instructions and forms needed for compliance with all of the HIPAA Rules i.e., the Privacy Rule and the newer Security and Transaction Rules. The 2003 edition of our Manual that was distributed to many clients addressed compliance only with the Privacy Rule. Compliance with the Privacy Rule is not the same as compliance with the Security Rule. The new Manual contains an essential HIPAA Security Standards Matrix in order for compliance with the Security Rule to be established and maintained. We have tried to make the Manual the most accurate, simple, and cost-effective compliance system possible and designed it especially for psychotherapy practices. We waited to publish a new edition until procedures to comply with all three of the Rules were established, as they now seem to be. The new Manual also contains as supplements basic record-keeping templates for psychotherapists (Intake and Treatment Planning form, Progress Note, Consultation Note and Termination Summary) and informed consent forms for individual, child, couple and family, and group therapy. Finally, a CD-ROM (pdf file) containing the entire Manual is included. Even practitioners who are not HIPAA compliant will find much of the information and many of the forms useful; HIPAA has established new standards of care for the privacy and security of patient health information that are relevant for all practitioners. An order form for the Manual, which costs $69.98 with tax and shipping, is included with this newsletter.
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